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SUMMARY 31 
Animal health surveillance enables the detection and control of animal diseases including zoonoses. 32 
Under the EU-FP7 project RISKSUR, a survey was conducted in 11 EU Member States and Switzerland 33 
to describe active surveillance components in 2011 managed by the public or private sector and 34 
identify gaps and opportunities. Information was collected about the hazard, target population, 35 
geographical focus, legal obligation, management, surveillance design, risk-based sampling, and 36 
multi-hazard surveillance. Two countries were excluded due to incompleteness of data. Most of the 37 
664 components targeted cattle (26.7%), pigs (17.5%) or poultry (16.0%). The most common 38 
surveillance objectives were demonstrating freedom from disease (43.8%) and case detection 39 
(26.8%). Over half of components applied risk-based sampling (57.1%), but mainly focused on a 40 
single population stratum (targeted risk-based) rather than differentiating between risk levels of 41 
different strata (stratified risk-based).  About a third of components were multi-hazard (37.3%). Both 42 
risk-based sampling and multi-hazard surveillance were used more frequently in privately funded 43 
components. The study identified several gaps (e.g. lack of systematic documentation, inconsistent 44 
application of terminology) and opportunities (e.g. stratified risk-based sampling). The greater 45 
flexibility provided by the new EU Animal Health Law means that systematic evaluation of 46 
surveillance alternatives will be required to optimize cost-effectiveness.   47 
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INTRODUCTION 48 
Animal health surveillance (AHS) forms a key element in the detection and control of animal and 49 
zoonotic diseases, in demonstrating disease freedom to ensure safe trade and providing valuable 50 
data for decision-support [1]. A key feature of surveillance is the need for the systematic (continuous 51 
or repeated) measurement, collection, collation, analysis, interpretation, and timely dissemination of 52 
data [2]. Hence, single surveys or analytical studies do not fall under this surveillance definition. The 53 
need for systematic analysis and interpretation arises from the close link between surveillance and 54 
intervention strategies in case undesired changes are observed [3], which distinguishes surveillance 55 
from monitoring systems. Monitoring, i.e. the collection of animal health data without a clear related 56 
action plan, usually only applies when the aim is to assess the initial health status of a population, 57 
whilst otherwise data collection without a clear related action plan should not be encouraged [4]. In 58 
contrast to passive surveillance, which relies on the detection and reporting of clinical signs, active 59 
surveillance is initiated by the investigator using a defined protocol to perform actions that are 60 
scheduled in advance [2]. Whilst public health surveillance commonly relies on notifiable disease 61 
reporting (passive surveillance) and the analysis of secondary data, AHS places stronger emphasis on 62 
collecting primary data via active surveillance for example to fulfill trade requirements and ensure 63 
food safety. 64 
In the European Union (EU) AHS is regulated by the Community Animal Health Policy (CAHP), which 65 
aims to reduce the negative impact of animal diseases on animal and public health, animal welfare, 66 
and the economy by ensuring safe intra-community trade with live animals and animal products [5]. 67 
Historically, the CAHP included almost 50 basic directives and regulations and 400 pieces of 68 
secondary legislation, most of which were adopted between 1988 and 1995 [1]. An external 69 
evaluation launched by the Commission in 2004 to assess the performance of the CAHP concluded 70 
that it lacks an overall strategy, places insufficient focus on disease prevention and does not provide 71 
enough flexibility to adapt new scientific and technological developments. Audit reports also 72 
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indicated different interpretations of requirements e.g. regarding specifications of risk categories as 73 
part of the multi-annual national control plan, resulting in diverse surveillance approaches taken by 74 
Member States [6]. The new EU Animal Health Law published in March 2016 [7] is based on the EU 75 
Animal Health Strategy “Prevention is better than cure” [5] and streamlines the huge number of legal 76 
acts into a single law, which shall also prevent piecemeal and crisis-driven policy development in the 77 
future [1]. Besides EU regulations, national and regional requirements as well as private initiatives 78 
exist, which vary between countries. Hence, the surveillance landscape in the EU includes a mixture 79 
of regulated and non-regulated activities managed by the public sector, private sector or both.  80 
Given budget limitations, it is crucial to carefully design and regularly evaluate surveillance systems 81 
to optimize cost-effectiveness. Traditionally, input-based standards were applied, which required 82 
specific activities to be carried out regardless of the characteristics of the population. In recent years, 83 
considerable progress has been made regarding surveillance design. Alternative approaches include 84 
the application of output-based standards [8, 9], where surveillance is designed to meet defined 85 
requirements (surveillance sensitivity, design prevalence), thus supporting flexible approaches 86 
targeted to the characteristics of the population under surveillance and the available capacities. Two 87 
probabilistic output-based measures are applied, i.e. the probability (“confidence”) of detecting a 88 
case (surveillance sensitivity) and the probability that a population is free from disease (negative 89 
predictive value) [8]. Whilst surveillance sensitivity allows achieving the targeted probability at the 90 
set design prevalence for different testing regimes, sample sizes and risk strata, the negative 91 
predictive value provides opportunities to combine information from multiple surveillance 92 
components and to take the value of historical information into account [8, 10, 11]. Consequently, 93 
heterogeneity in populations can be more adequately accounted for including various risk levels [9], 94 
and surveillance effectiveness can be quantified in populations that are too small to achieve the 95 
desired probability of detection by applying input-based standards [10-12]. Hence, these probabilistic 96 
approaches offer opportunities to lower costs whilst achieving the same target or achieve greater 97 
effectiveness at the same cost. Various analyses have been published demonstrating the superiority 98 
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of output-based over input-based standards or risk-based over random sampling strategies. For 99 
instance, it was estimated that risk-based strategies reduced the cost to demonstrate freedom from 100 
infectious bovine rhinotraecheitis and enzootic bovine leucosis in the EU between 2002 and 2009 by 101 
six million Euros [13]. Output-based standards have been evaluated for example for Trichinella spp. 102 
[14], Bovine Herpes virus 1 [15], Avian Influenza virus [16], Transmissible Spongiform 103 
Encephalopathies [17, 18], Mycobacterium bovis subsp. tuberculosis [19-22], Mycobacterium avium 104 
subsp. paratuberculosis [11, 23, 24], Classical Swine Fever virus [25], Bluetongue Disease virus [26], 105 
and resistant pathogens [27]. However, output-based approaches need to be based on sound 106 
epidemiological knowledge including an  evaluation  of  the  epidemiological situation in the region, 107 
require close collaboration and exchange between scientists and policy makers [13] and need to be 108 
documented in a transparent manner to allow cross-country comparisons [28].  109 
For early detection (or early-warning surveillance), alternative approaches include for example 110 
sentinel, participatory and syndromic surveillance strategies [29]. Syndromic surveillance can be 111 
defined as “surveillance of health indicators and diseases in defined populations in order to increase 112 
the likelihood of timely detection of undefined (new) or unexpected (exotic or re-emerging) threats” 113 
[2].  By detecting a disease early, potential devastating consequences of spread and thus economic 114 
impacts can be considerably minimised [28, 30]. Testing the same samples simultaneously for 115 
multiple hazards (multi-hazard surveillance) presents a general option to reduce surveillance costs 116 
and thus provides an important alternative to consider compared to targeting a single hazard only. 117 
Although these approaches are increasingly promoted in scientific research, there is a lack of 118 
overview of AHS activities in EU countries and to what extent alternative strategies are already in 119 
place. Therefore, as part of the EU-FP7 RISKSUR project (2012-2015) (http://www.fp7-risksur.eu/), a 120 
survey was carried out to describe existing surveillance activities in EU countries, with the aim to 121 
identify gaps and opportunities. Furthermore, a better understanding of existing surveillance 122 
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activities and differences between countries also contributed to inform the development of decision 123 
support tools for the design and evaluation of surveillance systems (http://webtools.fp7-risksur.eu/). 124 
METHODS 125 
Survey design: The reference year was 2011 as this was the latest reporting period for which 126 
expenditures were accessible at the time of data collection (spring to autumn 2013). All seven 127 
“partner countries” (CH, DE, ES, FR, NL, SE, UK) of the RISKSUR consortium as well as five selected 128 
“non-partner countries” (BG, CZ, DK, IE, IT) were included in the data collection process 129 
(subsequently referred to as study countries). Non-partner countries had been selected based on 130 
dissimilarity to partner countries regarding geographical region (e.g. targeting countries from Eastern 131 
and Southern Europe) and animal populations, production systems and hazards present, as well as 132 
the availability of a responsive official contact person. Furthermore, an in-country contact person 133 
had to be available to support data collection, especially due to language barriers and insufficient 134 
publicly accessible information on surveillance components, which would not have allowed for data 135 
collection otherwise.  136 
Sequential numbers were randomly assigned to countries to preserve confidentiality. All hazards 137 
(e.g. pathogens, syndromes, antimicrobial resistance, animal welfare) and species were covered, 138 
regardless of whether surveillance was managed by the public or private sector. Surveillance 139 
associated with import or export testing was not considered as requirements depend on the trading 140 
partners of the respective country. Even though data were collected on active and passive 141 
components, only active surveillance components were considered in this analysis as data on passive 142 
surveillance were considered to be too similar between countries. 143 
Questionnaire design: A questionnaire, comprising two sections with a total of 26 variables, was 144 
designed to collect information on surveillance components (see Supplementary Section S1 for a 145 
copy of the questionnaire and Supplementary Table S1 for examples). A surveillance component was 146 
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defined as a single surveillance activity used to investigate the occurrence of one or more hazards or 147 
health events in a specified population, and which has a self-contained (i.e. conclusive and 148 
comprehensive in itself) surveillance protocol that focusses on a particular data source.  The 149 
following key variables were used for analysis: targeted threat, disease or health event, target 150 
population, species and sector(s), geographical focus (local, national or regional), primary purpose, 151 
legal obligation, management (private, public or both), description of the component, study design 152 
(e.g. survey, continuous data collection), case definition (e.g. laboratory test for pathogen/toxins or 153 
host response, clinical signs, pathology, indirect indicators), risk-based sampling, and multi-hazard 154 
surveillance. Cost information is not presented in this paper as data gaps were too large to make 155 
meaningful inferences. Risk-based sampling was defined as “preferentially sampling strata within the 156 
target population that are more likely to be exposed, affected, detected, become affected, transmit 157 
infection, or cause other consequences” [4]. For risk-based components, a post-hoc distinction was 158 
further made between targeted risk-based (focusing only on one sub-stratum of the population) and 159 
stratified risk-based (sampling intensity differs between population strata). Multi-hazard surveillance 160 
was defined as ”surveillance activities where samples collected for one disease agent are analysed 161 
for more than one purpose or for other disease agents, either in parallel or at a later stage”.  For the 162 
surveillance definitions and characteristics used in the questionnaire, data collectors were referred 163 
to the final report from the International Conference on Animal Health Surveillance (ICAHS) in May 164 
2011 [4]. 165 
Data collection: The questionnaire was circulated within the RISKSUR consortium to collate feedback.  166 
Twenty-nine staff from RISKSUR partner countries collected the data in their own country and in 167 
collaboration with the assigned contact person in non-partner countries. All but one data collector 168 
were either trained veterinarians (n = 24) or animal scientists (n = 5). One external data collector who 169 
was temporarily employed in one non-partner country to ensure that language did not present a 170 
barrier was not working in the veterinary field. A training session was held with data collectors via 171 
Skype to review the protocol and thus standardize data collection. After approval by the RVC ethics 172 
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committee (No. 2013 0071H: Ethical clearance for RISKSUR mapping), a database was developed in 173 
Microsoft ACCESS® (Microsoft Corporation, Redmond, Virginia) and distributed amongst data 174 
collectors. Information on surveillance components was predominantly collected through a grey 175 
literature search, including government or non-government reports, national legislations and other 176 
information, whilst scientific literature only sometimes provided indications of surveillance efforts. 177 
Representatives from public and private institutions were contacted to verify or complement 178 
information [31]. Finally, data were re-entered into a shared web-based SQL database.  179 
Data management: Seven researchers from six institutes (APHA, CIRAD, FLI, RVC, SVA, UCM) spent 180 
two months on consistency checks of a sub-set of the database [31], which included discussions on 181 
standardized use of terminology and application to recorded components. A terminology working 182 
group was initiated to verify conclusions regarding means of data acquisition and surveillance 183 
purpose and objective [32].  Based on the results of this working group, the term ‘surveillance 184 
objective’ will be used instead of ‘surveillance purpose’ throughout the text. Prior to preparing this 185 
manuscript, a final consistency check was performed by a single investigator. This involved checking 186 
categorisations once again of those key variables, for which strong inconsistencies were identified 187 
during the initial consistency checks (i.e. surveillance objective, means of data acquisition, and risk-188 
based sampling) and verification that components were consistently split according to the following 189 
criteria: 1) Individual hazard(s) unless for unspecific components (e.g. meat inspection); 2) specified 190 
population: Species and if applicable target sector; 3) data source: Sampling point, case definition; 4) 191 
risk-based sampling; and 5) data collection method (means of data acquisition, study design). 192 
Data analysis: Data were analysed in Stata (StataCorp. 2015. Stata Statistical Software: Release 14. 193 
College Station, TX: StataCorp LP). A stacked bar chart of the number of components stratified by the 194 
sector managing the component (public, private, both, unknown) was created.  Countries with 195 
obvious deficiencies in data completeness were excluded from subsequent analyses. Surveillance 196 
component was chosen as the level of analysis. The percentage and 95% confidence interval of 197 
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components (number of recorded components / total number of recorded components) were 198 
calculated for each variable using the cii command. Associations between each variable with the 199 
independent variables management, species and objective were explored using r x c contingency 200 
tables. Cells with low frequencies were collapsed or discarded if considered appropriate. The 201 
conditional probabilities (column percentages; tabulate command) and adjusted residuals (tabchi 202 
command) were reported. Any cell with adjusted residuals greater than ±1.96 was highlighted in 203 
bold, as they are more extreme than would be expected if the null hypothesis of independence was 204 
true [33].  205 
Completeness of surveillance components per country was estimated by matching the components 206 
recorded by each country with all obligatory EU components identified in the dataset (see 207 
Supplementary Table S2) and dividing the achieved number by the total. An EU component was 208 
considered obligatory if it was compulsory for any EU Member State, not just relating to restriction 209 
zones or countries with eradication programmes in place. 210 
RESULTS 211 
Descriptive results 212 
The dataset prior to the final consistency check included 738 active AHS components. Seventy-three 213 
components were excluded as they were combined with another component (n = 42), failed to meet 214 
the surveillance definition (n = 10), included insufficient information (n = 8), related to export/import 215 
(n = 8), or were duplicates or considered erroneous (n = 5). Twenty-two components were added as 216 
recorded variables justified splitting the original component to achieve consistency in component 217 
splitting with other countries. Hence, the final dataset included 687 components.  218 
The number of active AHS components recorded per country (median: 57.5; range: 10 – 105) 219 
stratified by the sector responsible for management (public, private or both) is shown in 220 
Supplementary Figure S1. In most countries, components were predominantly managed publicly 221 
11 
 
(median across countries: 65.6%; IQR: 47.5 – 75.7%) with a smaller percentage being managed 222 
privately (median: 19.8%; IQR: 9.3 – 25.6%) or in a public-private partnership (median: 7.9%; IQR: 3.9 223 
– 10.8%).  224 
Countries 5 (n = 13) and 11 (n = 10) were excluded from subsequent analyses as their data were 225 
considered to be too incomplete, thus resulting in 664 components in the final data set. The 226 
remaining countries reported 34.1 to 90.2% of the 43 obligatory EU components identified in the 227 
data set (median: 59.8%; interquartile range: 48.2 – 84.1%) (see Supplementary Table S2).  228 
Components targeted 55 specific hazards (592 components), 21 hazard groups (e.g. wildlife diseases, 229 
emerging diseases) (n = 62) and three indicators (genetic, health, welfare) (n = 10). Supplementary 230 
Table S3 shows the number of components per hazard, the number of countries reporting at least 231 
one component for this hazard, and the median, minimum and maximum number of components for 232 
those latter countries. The most frequent hazards targeted by the hazard-specific components were 233 
Salmonella spp. (16.1%), Brucella spp. (7.7%), Mycobacterium tuberculosis (4.4%), Classical Swine 234 
Fever virus (3.9%), bluetongue disease virus (3.8%), avian influenza virus, scrapie virus and Trichinella 235 
spp. (3.6% each), and Aujeszky’s disease and Enzootic Bovine Leucosis (3.3% each).   236 
Descriptive results for all study countries and stratified by partner and non-partner countries are 237 
presented in Table 1. Categories of three variables significantly differed between partner and non-238 
partner countries, i.e. legal requirement, management and risk-based sampling.  239 
Cattle were the most frequent species targeted by components (26.7%), followed by pigs (17.5%), 240 
poultry (16.0%), and small ruminants (11.9%). Country 9 did not record any wildlife components and 241 
countries 1 and 7 only one general wildlife component. The category ‘other species’ covered fish (13 242 
components), insect vectors (n = 9), and bees (n = 3). Less than five components were recorded for 243 
molluscs, shellfish or crustaceans (n = 4), animal feed (n = 4), and pets (n = 1). Most components 244 
were implemented at the national level (89.4%) and were based on EU regulations (68.4%). Twelve 245 
percent of components were based on additional national requirements.  246 
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The most commonly assigned surveillance objective was demonstrating freedom from disease 247 
(43.8%), followed by case detection (26.8%), prevalence estimation (19.7%), and early detection 248 
(9.8%). The sampling point was recorded as farm, abattoir, and insemination centre for 48.6%, 249 
21.4%, and 15.6% of components, respectively. Data were usually recorded to be collected 250 
continuously (56.8%) or via repeated (usually annual) surveys (39.2%). Case reports (n = 15), sentinel 251 
surveillance (n = 8), participatory surveillance (n = 2), and event-based surveillance (n = 1) were 252 
recorded under ‘other study designs’. Laboratory diagnosis (direct, indirect or both) was the most 253 
common case definition. Active clinical surveillance (n = 12), i.e. routine inspection by the competent 254 
authority without prior notification of abnormal signs by farmers, targeted Bluetongue disease, 255 
Classical Swine Fever and emerging diseases in more than one country. Most ‘other case definitions’ 256 
contained multiple case definitions including others than laboratory detection (e.g. indirect 257 
indicators, risk factors). Risk-based sampling and multi-hazard surveillance were recorded for 57.1% 258 
and 37.3% of components, respectively. 259 
Bivariate results: Management 260 
Components managed in a public-private partnership were more likely recorded (than what would 261 
be expected if the variables were independent) by partner (85.3%) than non-partner countries 262 
(14.8%) (Table 2). Privately managed components more frequently targeted cattle (46.6%) and less 263 
frequently small ruminants (8.4%) than public components (34.0% and 21.5%, respectively). Sixty 264 
percent of private components compared to 39.9% of public components aimed to demonstrate 265 
freedom from disease. In contrast, prevalence estimation and early detection were more frequently 266 
recorded as surveillance objective for public (22.7% and 11.5%) than for private components (8.6% 267 
and 3.3%). Continuous data collection was more commonly managed publicly (61.2%) than privately 268 
(39.5%), whilst repeated surveys were more predominant for private (58.6%) than public 269 
components. Risk-based strategies and multi-hazard surveillance were more often recorded for 270 
privately (66.0% and 68.1%, respectively) than for publicly managed components (53.1% and 28.6%, 271 
respectively). 272 
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Bivariate results: Species 273 
Components targeting pigs were more likely based on additional national regulations (23.0%) than 274 
those targeting poultry (6.1%) (Table 3). The objective of demonstrating freedom from disease was 275 
more likely recorded for cattle and pigs (59.1% and 58.6%) than for poultry (15.1%). Case detection 276 
was more frequently recorded for poultry (65.1%) compared to the other three species groups, 277 
whilst prevalence estimation was more likely recorded for small ruminants (35.4%) compared to 278 
poultry  (8.5%). Farm was more frequently recorded as sampling point for poultry and small 279 
ruminants (61.3 – 89.1%) than for cattle (46.0%) and pigs (37.2%), whilst abattoir was more common 280 
for surveillance components targeting pigs (38.1%) compared to poultry (10.9%). Risk-based 281 
strategies were relatively seldom recorded for pigs (50.4%), whilst multi-hazard surveillance was 282 
relatively frequent for pigs (59.0%) and cattle (44.0%). In contrast, multi-hazard surveillance was 283 
relatively uncommon for poultry (8.1%). 284 
Bivariate results: Surveillance objective 285 
The objective prevalence estimation was more frequently recorded by partner (72.9%) than by non-286 
partner countries (27.1%) (Table 4). Components were more commonly implemented at the national 287 
level for the objective of demonstrating disease freedom than for early detection and at the regional 288 
level vice versa. Seventy-six percent of components with the objective of demonstrating freedom 289 
from disease were regulated by the EU compared to 45.5% of components aimed at early detection. 290 
Components aimed at early detection were more frequently regulated by national regulations or 291 
voluntary programmes than components with other objectives. At the farm level, the most frequent 292 
objectives were case detection (79.4%) and early detection (71.7%). The objective of annual surveys 293 
at insemination centres was consistently categorized as demonstrating freedom from disease 294 
(100%). Components aimed at demonstrating freedom from disease most commonly applied risk-295 
based sampling (63.3%) and multi-hazard surveillance (59.5%) compared to other objectives (44.2 – 296 
57.9% and 12.8 – 35.1%, respectively).  297 
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Risk-based sampling 298 
The most frequent risk factors were production type (breeder, grower), age, region, herd size, and 299 
time period (Table 5). Of these top five risk factors, production type, age, and herd size 300 
predominantly included targeted risk-based strategies, where only a single stratum is under 301 
surveillance (e.g. only breeders or only animals above a certain age). In contrast, for the risk factor 302 
region, the component description mostly indicated stratified risk-based sampling, e.g. targeting 303 
regions with different sampling intensity depending on differences in epidemiological situation or risk 304 
of introduction. For the risk factor period, both targeted (e.g. sampling at the end of high risk period 305 
to demonstrate freedom from disease) and stratified risk-based approaches (varying sampling 306 
intensities between seasons) were reported. 307 
DISCUSSION 308 
To the authors’ knowledge, this is the first systematic analysis of publicly and privately funded AHS 309 
components in EU Member States and Switzerland. Generating an overview of all active AHS 310 
components covering the public and private sectors and the full range of hazards and species was 311 
challenging as existence and design of surveillance components are generally not systematically 312 
documented [31]. Hence, gaps and opportunities were identified not just related to AHS design, but 313 
also to the ease and quality of data collection. This survey showed that the public and private sectors 314 
applied a range of activities at the national and regional level in addition to obligatory EU 315 
requirements. Even though data quality did not allow any in-depth between-country comparisons, 316 
observed patterns across the whole dataset are considered to provide valuable insights into how AHS 317 
was performed in 2011 in the ten study countries included in the analysis.  318 
Differences between partner and non-partner countries 319 
Systematic differences may exist between partner and non-partner countries due to the following 320 
reasons: Partner countries were comprised only of EU-12 Member States predominantly situated in 321 
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Central and Western Europe, who have a strong interest in animal health surveillance, which led to 322 
their participation in the RISKSUR project. This selection bias was aimed to be reduced by also 323 
incorporating EU-15 (CZ) and EU-25 (BG) Member States in the group of non-partner countries, 324 
which however also included three EU-12 Member States (DK, IE, IT) thus comprising a more 325 
heterogeneous group of Central, Southern and South-Eastern European countries. Furthermore, 326 
potential differences in the efforts of collecting the data, data accessibility and availability of contacts 327 
may have occurred given that partner countries may have had better contacts to relevant institutions 328 
and a stronger interest in data collection given their participation in the project consortium. 329 
Acknowledging these potential differences between partner and non-partner countries, we stratified 330 
descriptive results and tested for the effect of partner country (yes/no) as part of the bivariate 331 
analyses.   332 
Descriptive results indicated significant differences between partner and non-partner countries for 333 
the variables management (category “both”), legal obligation (EU, private and none) and risk-based 334 
sampling (yes/no). The differences in management and legal obligation may indicate stronger 335 
investment of partner countries in non-EU regulated privately managed surveillance activities 336 
compared to non-partner countries. Another explanation may be that  private and voluntary 337 
components were better captured in partner than non-partner countries given that data collection 338 
was highly challenging, so that a variety of information sources had to be screened and over 20 339 
contacts were approached in some countries as part of data collection [34]. The difference in the 340 
percentage of risk-based components was not as pronounced as for the variables legal obligation and 341 
management. Avian influenza virus and Aujeszky’s disease virus were the only hazards for which the 342 
number of total components justified a comparison at the hazard level between partner and non-343 
partner countries. For avian influenza, the difference was driven by one non-partner country 344 
recording eight surveillance components, all of which were risk-based as opposed to one to four 345 
components recorded by other countries, some of which were risk-based, whilst others were not. For 346 
Aujeszky’s disease, wildlife components were only recorded in partner countries (n = 2), none of 347 
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which were risk-based, and abattoir surveillance was recorded as risk-based in both non-partner 348 
countries but only in one out of four partner countries recording this component. Therefore, we 349 
conclude that the difference can be considered as spurious given that the percentages are to some 350 
degree affected by the number of recorded components.   351 
Bivariate results indicated a significant effect of partner versus non-partner countries for the 352 
variables management (category “both”) and objective (category “prevalence estimation”), but not 353 
for the four compared livestock species groups. For the variable management, the same arguments 354 
apply as discussed above.  The higher number of components aimed at prevalence estimation may 355 
indicate that partner countries invest relatively more to assess changes in the hazard situation (e.g. 356 
antimicrobial resistance). 357 
Surveillance objective and means of data collection 358 
For active surveillance components, demonstrating freedom from disease was the most common 359 
objective, whilst early detection was least common. These objectives are in fact closely linked as 360 
activities to demonstrate freedom from disease are generally based on annual surveys, after which 361 
early detection is needed to maintain confidence in freedom until the next survey. Early detection 362 
activities were underrepresented in the data as passive surveillance components were excluded a 363 
priori given that they were considered too similar between countries. However, for many hazards 364 
passive surveillance is the predominant early detection component as it is continuously performed 365 
on a daily basis across the entire domestic (and wildlife) animal population. Furthermore, it can be 366 
highly cost-effective as testing is only performed if disease is suspected. For example Welby et al [35]  367 
estimated detection probability (component sensitivity; CSe) and cost-effectiveness (CSe/cost in 368 
€1000) for three surveillance components targeting Bluetongue virus serotype 8 in Belgium and The 369 
Netherlands. Based on a within-herd prevalence of 20% and the assumption that disease awareness 370 
is high, passive surveillance resulted in the highest probability of detection (CSe = 0.99) as compared 371 
to active cross-sectional surveys (CSe: 0.73 - 0.75) and sentinel surveillance (CSe: 0.29 – 0.33) and a 372 
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cost efficiency ratio of 1.38 as compared to 0.52 (survey) and 0.41 (sentinel). However, sensitivity of 373 
passive surveillance is influenced by the clinical effects of disease, rate of transmission, population 374 
structure (e.g. herd size, production system), disease awareness of animal owners and veterinarians, 375 
and their preparedness to report [35, 36]. Therefore, it is important to also evaluate the sensitivity of 376 
passive surveillance [36], compare strategies to enhance disease awareness (e.g. awareness 377 
campaigns, training, adequacy of compensation) and reporting, and assess the acceptability by key 378 
stakeholders [37-39]. Effective dissemination of surveillance results to farmers and the public can 379 
also enhance engagement of these stakeholders and improve participation.  380 
Given these limitations, active surveillance and syndromic surveillance may effectively enhance early 381 
detection [29]. Syndromic surveillance is also a (near) real-time surveillance activity aimed at early 382 
detection. Compared to passive surveillance, syndromic surveillance is less observer-dependent 383 
(depending on data source) and may detect abnormalities (e.g. in animal performance) before 384 
clinical signs occur, thus potentially resulting in enhanced timeliness. As part of One Health, 385 
syndromic surveillance in animal populations also provides opportunities for the early detection of 386 
public health risks [40]. Welby et al [35] estimated the probability of syndromic surveillance to detect 387 
Bluetongue serotype 8 in NL as 0.98 and 0.99 for milk production data assuming a within-herd 388 
prevalence of 2% and 20%, respectively.  Despite the high effectiveness that can be achieved via 389 
syndromic surveillance, its application requires access to data sources that are sensitive to changes in 390 
the level of disease in the population [40] and efficient algorithms that can detect potential outbreak 391 
signals [41]. The current study identified 19 syndromic surveillance components recorded by four of 392 
the ten study countries. Ten of these components targeted multiple diseases, e.g. emerging diseases 393 
(n = 9) or many diseases (n = 1), whereas the remaining components were hazard-specific (n = 5) or 394 
targeted disease syndromes, i.e. mastitis or metabolic disorders (n = 4). Diagnostic material and 395 
pathology examinations were mentioned as predominant data sources (n = 9). Furthermore, 396 
production data (n = 5), information from practitioners (n = 1) and information sources of 397 
government, public and charity organizations (n = 1) were recorded, whilst the remaining three 398 
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components included insufficient information on the data source.  These data suggest that 399 
syndromic surveillance is not being fully utilised by all countries yet, which is also in line with Dorea 400 
et al  [31]. 401 
Risk-based sampling and multi-hazard surveillance 402 
For active components aimed at early detection, comprehensive coverage is generally not cost-403 
effective as disease needs to be detected at very low prevalence to fulfil the aim of early detection 404 
[42]. Therefore, risk-based and alternative approaches (e.g. syndromic surveillance) are important to 405 
consider to enhance the likelihood of (early) detection. Efforts to demonstrate freedom from disease 406 
and detect cases also benefit from risk-based approaches, especially risk-based sampling and risk-407 
based requirement (i.e. incorporation of historical data) [10, 43], as the aim is to detect disease 408 
rather than providing representative estimates such as for prevalence estimation. The current data 409 
indicate that 50%, 63%, and 57.9% of components with the objectives early detection, demonstrating 410 
freedom from disease, and case detection, respectively, included risk-based approaches. Risk-based 411 
strategies and multi-hazard surveillance were more commonly recorded for the private sector 412 
compared to the public sector. Since 2/3 of private components were based on EU-regulations, this 413 
may only be partly explained by less stringent legal requirements. Differences between countries in 414 
the extent components are managed publicly or privately may contribute to the higher likelihood of 415 
risk-based approaches in the private sector with some countries being more progressive than others. 416 
But the private sector may also be under higher pressure to demonstrate cost-effectiveness, which is 417 
supported by the fact that the private sector more commonly focussed on aspects with higher 418 
economic importance (e.g. cattle and pigs, demonstrating disease freedom to ensure trade). Based 419 
on these findings it is hypothesized that risk-based sampling and multi-hazard surveillance could be 420 
incorporated more strongly as part of public animal health surveillance. 421 
Albeit risk-based sampling was recorded for more than half of components, most of these risk-based 422 
components were targeted, only focussing on one population stratum instead of adjusting 423 
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surveillance intensity according to the risk level of different strata. Whilst it may be justified in some 424 
cases to only focus on a single stratum (e.g. serological surveillance in older animals), no statement 425 
can be made on the population strata not included. Therefore targeted risk-based sampling as 426 
recorded for most of the risk-based components is in fact similar to conventional designs, just being 427 
focussed on a single population stratum. Stratified risk-based sampling in contrast distinguishes 428 
between high- and low-risk strata of the population. Since all animals have a nonzero probability of 429 
being selected, probabilistic statements can still be made for the entire population, but surveillance 430 
sensitivity can be increased given a constant sample size or sample size can be reduced at constant 431 
target sensitivity. Furthermore, stratified risk-based sampling allows maintaining low level 432 
surveillance in low-risk strata to help retain awareness and provide incentives to comply with 433 
regulations, e.g. the withdrawal period for antibiotics [27].  434 
Movement data provide opportunities to distinguish between farms having a high risk of 435 
introduction or spread based on the frequency of in- and out-degree movements and the number 436 
and characteristics of trading partners. However, animal movements were only recorded as a risk 437 
criterion by two countries (four components), one of which only targeted high turnover premises (i.e. 438 
targeted risk-based). Hence, opportunities exist to enhance utilization of quantitative (e.g. 439 
movement data), but also qualitative data (e.g. biosecurity level) to distinguish between risk levels of 440 
different population strata. The data provided little evidence of the application of alternative 441 
approaches such as participatory [44] or event-based surveillance [45].  442 
Legal requirements 443 
Many EU and national legislations still prescribe what has to be done (input-based) rather than what 444 
has to be achieved (output-based) and generally focus on a single pathogen. Such input-based 445 
requirements do not provide much stimulus to evaluate alternative surveillance designs in order to 446 
identify the most cost-effective approach for the specific population to be targeted. Even though 447 
input-based standards are simple to compare between countries, they may result in low sensitivity in 448 
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some population strata and excessive sample numbers in others [9]. EU countries vary considerably 449 
in their population structure, trading patterns, hazard situation, and risk factors. Output-based 450 
standards allow tailoring surveillance to the population of interest. However, epidemiologically 451 
sound application of output-based standards requires epidemiological expertise, knowledge 452 
regarding the target population, good data quality, and transparency. Interestingly, more recent 453 
regulations (e.g. 2006/88/EC for aquatic animals, 2007/268/EC for avian influenza virus, 1266/2007 454 
for bluetongue disease virus – see Supplementary Table S2) encourage application of risk-based 455 
approaches and multi-hazard surveillance, indicating that the propagation of these alternative 456 
strategies in literature has informed legal requirements. Also, the new EU Animal Health Law 457 
explicitly emphasizes the need to take into account the epidemiology of disease, risk factors and 458 
characteristics of the target population (Article 27) and allows application of alternative strategies 459 
such as accounting for historical data to maintain disease free status (Article 36(1d)). Hence, the new 460 
EU Animal Health Law provides enhanced opportunities to apply alternative surveillance approaches 461 
to increase effectiveness and cost-efficiency of surveillance.    462 
Importance of hazards 463 
Economic importance and zoonotic potential (7/10 of the most frequent hazards have zoonotic 464 
potential) appear to be important drivers for surveillance. As a result, species with little economic 465 
value such as pets and wildlife were less frequently covered, which presents another gap in 466 
surveillance. For zoonotic diseases, many alternative approaches have been promoted under the 467 
concept of One Health including systems thinking, participatory approaches and priority setting [46-468 
49], which can only be achieved via effective collaboration between sectors (public-private) and 469 
disciplines (animal-public health). Transparent documentation of surveillance components and 470 
formal assessments of the entire surveillance system for a given hazard may also provide 471 
opportunities to inform or benefit from these approaches and thus possibly enhance convergence 472 
between human and veterinary health agencies. Such One Health approaches are increasingly 473 
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promoted and present true opportunities to advance the effectiveness of zoonotic disease 474 
surveillance, early preparedness and protection of human and animal health in the EU.  475 
Sources of bias 476 
Selection bias might have occurred by including all partner countries and selecting five non-partner 477 
countries. However, a systematic and transparent selection process with clearly specified criteria was 478 
applied in an effort to minimize selection bias.  Due to time and resource constraints, data collection 479 
could not be expanded to all EU Member States.  480 
Furthermore, information bias may have occurred due to differences between countries in the 481 
availability of information and efforts made to seek additional information, centralisation of efforts, 482 
and willingness of contacts to share information. The efforts required collecting information on 483 
existing public and private surveillance activities covering all hazards and animal species exceeded 484 
expectations by far. Therefore, various grey literature sources had to be screened and contact 485 
persons approached to gather information on the full range of activities. Many countries have no 486 
centralised system capturing at least the existence and design of surveillance system activities. 487 
Furthermore, surveillance documentation was more difficult to obtain for the private than the public 488 
sector. In a post-hoc questionnaire, data collectors ranked statements that a) the existence and b) 489 
the design of surveillance was adequately documented in their country, resulting in a median rank of 490 
4 and 3 out of 5 (range 2-5) for public and 2 for both out of 5 (range 1-4) for private components 491 
[34]. Data collection also indicated considerable differences between countries regarding evaluation 492 
and dissemination of surveillance efforts as well as collaborations between the public and private 493 
sector. Furthermore, whilst some countries have a strongly centralised system (e.g. NL, SE, UK), 494 
others are strongly decentralised (e.g. DE, ES, FR). Regional variability is more pronounced in 495 
decentralised countries, which is difficult to capture. Lastly, some countries were concerned about 496 
confidentiality, so that participation was only agreed on if data were presented in aggregated form 497 
and countries were anonymised. These challenges were reflected by a wide range in the number of 498 
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reported components and percentage of obligatory EU components covered in the countries’ 499 
datasets. This latter percentage is underestimated as it is sometimes affected by the way 500 
components were split (i.e. a country merging components not merged by other countries). 501 
However, completeness has affected data quality in some countries, so that results have to be 502 
interpreted with care and no between-country comparisons were attempted.  503 
Another major limitation related to differences in applying terminology to specific components, 504 
which led to initial high variability in how variables were categorized between countries. As a result, 505 
extensive consistency checks were carried out and a terminology working group established to 506 
improve the comparability of data.  These inconsistencies in applying terminology and general 507 
inconsistencies between data collected, as shown in this study, could therefore be used as a basis to 508 
argue for a standardised documentation of the design of surveillance activities within the EU.  509 
Documentation guidelines or standard forms have for example been developed by EFSA for 510 
surveillance of Echinococcus multilocularis [50] and by the EU reference laboratory for surveillance of 511 
fish diseases (http://www.eurl-fish.eu/Activities/survey_and_diagnosis.aspx). But no standard 512 
requirements have been agreed on, which provide sufficient information to create an informed 513 
overview, but sufficient flexibility to accommodate different approaches and preserve the necessary 514 
degree of confidentiality. 515 
Recommendations regarding surveillance design 516 
It is difficult to make general recommendations regarding surveillance design as it depends on many 517 
factors such as the hazard and population under surveillance, the hazard situation and objective. 518 
When judging surveillance design, it is important to consider the surveillance system as a whole 519 
including its passive and active components as components may complement each other. This 520 
systems approach allows a) identifying surveillance gaps (i.e. sectors or age groups not covered) and 521 
components with sub-optimal effectiveness and b) assessing opportunities to increase effectiveness 522 
and economic efficiency.  523 
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The effectiveness of surveillance approaches can only be optimised if various surveillance designs are 524 
formally compared as demonstrated manifold in published literature over recent years. This may 525 
include comparisons of different testing regimes, sampling points and risk factors, strategies to 526 
enhance awareness or incorporation of historical data. Hence, systematic documentation of current 527 
designs, evaluation and comparisons with alternative strategies provide opportunities to select more 528 
effective and efficient surveillance approaches. However, improved transparency and documentation 529 
of design details may be needed to allow applying more flexible approaches.  530 
Recommendations derived from the process of collecting the data 531 
If registration of surveillance activities at country level was centralised, this would provide an 532 
overview and allow for better coordination of efforts to be made between the public and private 533 
sector. Furthermore, a minimum set of design variables could be defined in advance in order to 534 
achieve consistency in documentation. This could be achieved through the use of the surveillance 535 
design framework developed by the RISKSUR project, which provides a tool that  can be used for 536 
standardised documentation of surveillance efforts (http://webtools.fp7-risksur.eu/). Also, despite a 537 
common source of definitions, terminology may lead to differences in interpretations when applied 538 
to specific components, as shown by this study. Therefore, illustrating the correct application of 539 
terminology based on specific components may be useful to supplement definitions and thus achieve 540 
better consistency (http://www.fp7-risksur.eu/terminology). Given that surveillance can be 541 
perceived to be a sensitive topic, it is also important to clearly explain to contributing parties the 542 
purpose and expected outcome of more transparent documentation.  Confidentiality concerns may 543 
limit the application of alternative strategies, as these require transparent documentation to assess 544 
the adequacy of assumptions and design specifications. However, these limitations stand in contrast 545 
to the claim that surveillance is a public good [51]. Hence, there is a joint responsibility to address 546 
factors limiting transparent documentation of surveillance activities. 547 
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All these aspects do not just pertain to this study but may cause problems with any compilation of 548 
surveillance activities across EU Member States (e.g. EFSA reports, EU summary reports). Hence, 549 
these gaps hinder information sharing in general and limit the ability to integrate information from 550 
various sources (e.g. active/passive, public/private, different species) in a meaningful manner. It is 551 
hypothesised that increased transparency would benefit all parties by enhancing trust, facilitating 552 
meaningful comparisons, and allowing more targeted complementation of activities based on the 553 
evaluation of the entire surveillance system rather than its individual components in isolation.  554 
Conclusions 555 
The study identified several gaps (lack of systematic documentation, inconsistent application of 556 
terminology, little evidence of surveillance in species with low economic importance) and 557 
opportunities (e.g. better uptake of alternative methods, increased use of stratified risk-based 558 
sampling, application of novel approaches promoted as part of One Health). The greater flexibility 559 
provided by the new EU Animal Health Law means that systematic evaluation of surveillance 560 
alternatives will be required to ensure that surveillance is as efficient and effective as possible [52].  561 
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TABLES 745 
Table 1. Percentage of active surveillance components (number of recorded components / total 746 
number of recorded components) and 95% confidence intervals (95% CI) by surveillance design 747 
variables for all ten study countries and stratified by whether countries were partners of the EU-FP7 748 
RISKSUR project or not. Components comprised active surveillance components implemented in 749 
2011. Categories, for which confidence intervals between partner and non-partner countries did not 750 
overlap, are highlighted in grey. 751 
Variable (n)a Category 
 
All 
(n = 664) 
Partner 
(n = 421) 
Non-partner 
(n = 243) 
Species  
(664 / 421 / 243) 
Cattle 26.7 (23.3, 30.2) 26.8 (22.7, 31.3) 26.3 (20.9, 32.3) 
Pigs 17.5 (14.7, 20.6) 17.8 (14.3, 21.8) 16.9 (12.4, 22.2) 
Poultry 16.0 (13.3, 19.0) 14.0 (10.8, 17.7) 19.3 (14.6, 24.9) 
Small ruminants 11.9 (9.5, 14.6) 11.9 (8.9, 15.4) 11.9 (8.1, 16.7) 
Wildlife 10.2 (8.0, 12.8) 11.4 (8.5, 14.8) 8.2 (5.1, 12.4) 
Equidae 6.9 (5.1, 9.1) 7.4 (5.1, 10.3) 6.2 (3.5, 10.0) 
Multi 5.4 (3.8, 7.4) 5.0 (3.1, 7.5) 6.2 (3.5, 10.0) 
Other 5.4 (3.8, 7.4) 5.7 (3.7, 8.4) 4.9 (2.6, 8.5) 
Management  
(615 / 418 / 197) 
Public 65.4 (61.5, 69.1) 64.4 (59.6, 68.9) 67.5 (60.5, 74.0) 
Private 24.7 (21.4, 28.3) 23.2 (19.2, 27.6) 27.9 (21.8, 34.7) 
Both 9.9 (7.7, 12.6) 12.4 (9.4, 16.0) 4.6 (2.1, 8.5) 
Area  
(662 / 421 / 241) 
National 89.4 (86.8, 91.7) 87.4 (83.9, 90.4) 92.9 (88.9, 95.8) 
Regional 8.6 (6.6, 11.0) 9.7 (7.1, 13.0) 6.6 (3.8, 10.6) 
Local 2.0 (1.0, 3.3) 2.9 (1.5, 4.9) 0.4 (0, 2.3) 
Obligation 
(645 / 417 / 228) 
EU 68.4 (64.6, 71.9) 58.5 (53.6, 63.3) 86.4 (81.3, 90.6) 
National 11.6 (9.3, 14.4) 12.7 (9.7, 16.3) 9.6 (6.1, 14.2) 
Regional 2.2 (1.2, 3.6) 2.6 (1.3, 4.7) 1.3 (0.3, 3.8) 
Private 7.9 (59, 13) 11.8 (8.8, 15.2) 0.9 (0.1, 3.1) 
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Variable (n)a Category 
 
All 
(n = 664) 
Partner 
(n = 421) 
Non-partner 
(n = 243) 
None 9.9 (77, 125) 14.4 (11.2, 18.1) 1.8 (0.5, 4.4) 
Objective  
(656 / 417 / 239) 
Disease freedom 43.8 (399, 476) 41.7 (36.9, 46.6) 47.3 (40.8, 53.8) 
Case detection 26.8 (23.5, 30.4) 26.9 (22.7, 31.4) 26.8 (21.3, 32.9) 
Prevalence estimation 19.7 (16.7, 22.9) 22.5 (18.6, 26.9) 14.6 (10.4, 19.8) 
Early detection 9.8 (7.6, 12.3) 8.9 (6.3, 12.0) 11.3 (7.6, 16.0) 
Sampling point  
(646 / 405 / 241) 
Farm 48.6 (44.7, 52.5) 47.2 (42.2, 52.2) 51.0 (44.5, 57.5) 
Abattoir 21.4 (18.3, 24.7) 23.0 (19.0, 27.4) 18.7 (14.0, 24.2) 
Insemination 15.6 (12.9, 18.7) 14.8 (11.5, 18.7) 17.0 (12.5, 22.4) 
Wild 8.5 (6.5, 10.9) 8.4 (5.9, 11.5) 8.7 (5.5, 13.0) 
Rendering 3.7 (2.4, 5.5) 4.0 (2.3, 6.3) 3.3 (1.4, 6.4) 
 Other 2.2 (1.2, 3.6) 2.7 (1.4, 4.8) 1.2 (0.3, 3.6) 
Study type 
(655 / 415 / 240) 
Continous 56.8 (52.9, 60.6) 59.0 (54.1, 63.8) 52.9 (46.4, 59.4) 
Survey 39.2 (35.5, 43.1) 35.9 (31.3, 40.7) 45.0 (38.6, 51.5) 
Other 4.0 (2.6, 5.8) 5.1 (3.2, 7.6) 2.1 (0.7, 4.8) 
Case definition  
(655 / 417 / 238) 
Lab: Pathogen / toxin 42.9 (39.1, 46.8) 45.3 (40.5, 50.2) 38.7 (32.4, 45.2) 
Lab: Host response 37.9 (34.1, 41.7) 34.8 (30.2, 39.6) 43.3 (36.9, 49.8) 
Both 7.6 (5.7, 9.9) 5.5 (3.5, 8.2) 11.3 (7.6, 16.1) 
Clinical / pathological 2.9 (1.8, 4.5) 3.8 (2.2, 6.2) 1.3 (0.3, 3.6) 
Other 8.7 (6.7, 11.1) 10.6 (7.8, 13.9) 5.5 (2.9, 9.2) 
Risk-based  
(641 / 413 / 228) 
Yes 57.1 (53.2, 61.0) 52.1 (47.1, 57.0) 66.2 (59.7, 72.3) 
No 42.9 (39.0, 46.8) 47.9 (43.0, 52.9) 33.8 (27.7, 40.3) 
Multi-hazard  
(579 / 396 / 183) 
Yes 37.3 (33.4, 41.4) 40.4 (35.5, 45.4) 30.6 (24.0, 37.8) 
No 62.7 (58.6, 66.6) 59.6 (54.6, 64.5) 69.4 (62.2, 76.0) 
a Number of observations for those categories listed for the respective variable. The difference in observations 752 
compared to the number provided below the heading of 3rd to 5th column comprises the number of missing 753 
observations per category.  754 
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Table 2. Column percentages and adjusted residuals (in brackets)a of management versus variables for 756 
active surveillance components in 2011 recorded by 10 study countries included in the study (n = 615).  757 
Variable Category Public Private Both 
Partner country 
(n = 615) 
Yes 66.9 (-0.77) 63.8 (-1.26) 85.3 (3.05) 
No 33.1 (0.77) 36.2 (1.26) 14.8 (-3.05) 
Species group 
(n = 441) 
Cattle  34.0 (-2.43) 46.6 (2.25) 42.2 (0.53) 
Pigs 23.8 (0.39) 22.9 (-0.07) 20.0 (-0.53) 
Poultry 20.8 (-0.35) 22.1 (0.27) 22.2 (0.16) 
Small ruminants 21.5 (3.09) 8.4 (-3.13) 15.6 (-0.27) 
Geographical focus 
(n = 595) 
National 89.3 (-3.27) 97.2 (2.70) 96.5 (1.33) 
Regional  10.7 (3.27) 2.8 (-2.70) 3.5 (-1.33) 
Obligation 
(n = 610) 
EU  72.3 (2.85) 65.8 (-0.79) 49.2 (-3.40) 
National or regional 16.4 (2.37) 5.9 (-3.29) 18.0 (0.97) 
Private or voluntary 11.3 (-5.63) 28.3 (3.95) 32.8 (3.25) 
Surveillance objective 
(n = 608) 
Disease freedom 39.9 (-3.00) 59.9 (4.48) 32.7 (-1.80) 
Case detection 25.9 (-1.05) 28.3 (0.32) 34.6 (1.26) 
Prevalence estimation 22.7 (3.00) 8.6 (-3.86) 23.6 (0.87) 
Early detection 11.5 (2.68) 3.3 (-2.92) 9.1 (-0.03) 
Sampling point 
(n = 535) 
Farm 58.0 (1.48) 43.8 (-3.32) 70.0 (2.40) 
Abattoir 30.5 (5.27) 8.3 (-4.89) 16.7 (-1.24) 
Rendering plant 5.1 (1.52) 0.0 (-2.91) 8.3 (1.75) 
Insemination centre 6.3 (-8.58) 47.9 (11.31) 5.0 (-2.69) 
Study design 
(n = 609) 
Continuous 61.2 (4.42) 39.5 (-4.35) 50.0 (-0.75) 
Survey 33.6 (-5.16) 58.6 (5.06) 46.6 (0.90) 
Other 5.3 (1.67) 2.0 (-1.62) 3.5 (-0.33) 
Case definition 
(n = 556) 
Direct 66.1 (2.77) 37.4 (-3.04) 50.1 (1.01) 
Serological 23.2 (-2.64) 54.7 (4.21) 36.3 (-2.15) 
Both 7.1 (-0.42) 3.6 (-2.44) 10.8 (2.48) 
34 
 
Clinical / pathological 3.6 (0.15) 4.3 (0.83) 2.8 (-0.85) 
Risk-based 
(n = 600) 
Yes 53.1 (-2.42) 66.0 (2.66) 56.7 (0.00) 
No  46.9 (2.42) 34.0 (-2.66) 43.3 (0.00) 
Multi-hazard 
(n = 548) 
Yes 28.6 (-6.58) 68.1 (8.15) 31.7 (-1.21) 
No  71.4 (6.58) 31.9 (-8.15) 68.3 (1.21) 
a Adjusted residuals greater than ±1.96 were highlighted in bold as they are more extreme than what would be 758 
expected if the null hypothesis of independence was true. 759 
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Table 3. Column percentages and adjusted residuals (in brackets)a of livestock species versus variables 761 
for active surveillance components in 2011 recorded by 10 study countries (n = 487).  762 
Variable Category Cattle Pigs Poultry Small 
ruminants 
Partner country 
(n = 487) 
Yes 64.5 (0.75) 64.7 (0.57) 55.7 (-1.63) 63.3 (0.17) 
No 35.5 (-0.75) 35.3 (-0.57) 44.3 (1.63) 36.7 (-0.17) 
Geographical 
focus (n = 474) 
National 92.9 (-0.12) 89.0 (-1.89) 100.0 (3.20) 89.6 (-1.29) 
Regional  7.1 (0.12) 11.0 (1.89) 0.0 (-3.20) 10.4 (1.29) 
Obligation 
(n = 472) 
EU  68.1 (-0.51) 59.3 (-2.70) 86.7 (4.17) 65.8 (-0.78) 
National or regional 11.5 (-0.92) 23.0 (3.46) 6.1 (-2.36) 12.7 (-0.20) 
Private or voluntary 20.3 (1.45) 17.7 (0.17) 7.1 (-2.96) 21.5 (1.13) 
Surveillance 
objective 
(n = 487) 
Disease freedom 59.1 (4.36) 58.6 (2.97) 15.1 (-7.35) 41.8 (-0.94) 
Case detection 14.5 (-4.71) 17.2 (-2.59) 65.1 (10.18) 16.5 (-2.21) 
Prevalence 
estimation 
21.0 (0.83) 14.7 (-1.39) 8.5 (-3.14) 35.4 (4.04) 
Early detection 5.4 (-1.57) 9.5 (0.77) 11.3 (1.53) 6.3 (-0.53) 
Sampling point 
(n = 456) 
Farm 46.0 (-3.07) 37.2 (-4.40) 89.1 (7.36) 61.3 (1.20) 
Abattoir 20.5 (-0.60) 38.1 (4.78) 10.9 (-2.87) 14.7 (-1.66) 
Rendering plant 6.3 (1.33) 0.9 (-2.18) 0.0 (-2.36) 12.0 (3.34) 
Insemination centre 27.3 (3.87) 23.9 (1.73) 0.0 (-5.10) 12.0 (-1.57) 
Study design 
(n = 481) 
Continuous 51.6 (-0.55) 55.7 (0.60) 60.4 (1.67) 43.4 (-1.87) 
Survey 44.6 (0.24) 41.7 (-0.53) 37.7 (-1.44) 54.0 (1.93) 
Other 3.8 (0.92) 2.6 (-0.22) 1.9 (-0.71) 2.6 (-0.16) 
Case definition 
(n = 452) 
Direct 36.0 (-2.20) 24.6 (-4.48) 71.8 (6.75) 44.9 (0.38) 
Serological 55.3 (2.30) 60.9 (3.11) 24.3 (-5.49) 46.2 (-0.36) 
Both 7.5 (0.67) 10.0 (1.76) 1.9 (-2.11) 5.1 (-0.51) 
Clinical / pathological 1.2 (-1.39) 4.6 (1.42) 1.9 (-0.51) 3.9 (0.72) 
Risk-based Yes 65.6 (1.23) 50.4 (-2.95) 62.3 (0.05) 71.1 (1.76) 
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(n = 477) No  34.4 (-1.23) 49.6 (2.95) 37.7 (-0.05) 29.0 (-1.76) 
Multi-hazard 
(n = 426) 
Yes 44.0 (2.61) 59.0 (5.44) 8.1 (-6.64) 25.0 (-2.09) 
No  56.0 (-2.61) 41.0 (-5.44) 91.9 (6.64) 75.0 (2.09) 
a Adjusted residuals greater than ±1.96 were highlighted in bold as they are more extreme than what would be 763 
expected if the null hypothesis of independence was true. 764 
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Table 4. Column percentages and adjusted residuals (in brackets)a of surveillance objective versus 766 
variables for active surveillance components in 2011 recorded by 10 study countries (n = 656). 767 
Variable Category Case detection Early detection Disease 
freedom 
Prevalence 
estimation 
Partner country  
(n = 656) 
Yes 63.6 (0.02) 57.8 (-1.01) 60.6 (-1.38) 72.9 (2.45) 
No 36.4 (-0.02) 42.2 (1.01) 39.4 (1.38) 27.1 (-2.45) 
Geographical focus  
(n = 636) 
National 91.2 (-0.36) 84.4 (-2.29) 95.7 (3.11) 88.0 (-1.74) 
Regional  8.8 (0.36) 15.6 (2.29) 4.3 (-3.11) 12.0 (1.74) 
Obligation  
(n = 636) 
EU  65.5 (-0.96) 45.5 (-3.83) 76.4 (3.86) 64.6 (-1.04) 
National or 
regional 
13.2 (-0.21) 23.6 (2.25) 11.4 (-1.47) 15.0 (0.47) 
Private or 
voluntary 
21.3 (1.35) 30.9 (2.63) 12.1 (-3.37) 20.5 (0.84) 
Sampling point 
(n = 574) 
Farm 79.4 (7.28) 71.7 (2.37) 40.4 (-6.31) 46.9 (-1.94) 
Abattoir 19.4 (-1.40) 23.9 (0.10) 19.2 (-2.09) 38.1 (4.12) 
Rendering plant 1.3 (-2.18) 4.4 (0.06) 1.2 (-3.22) 15.0 (6.44) 
Insemination 
centre 
0.0 (-6.84) 0.0 (-3.25) 39.2 (12.31) 0.0 (-5.45) 
Study design 
(n = 649) 
Continuous 69.9 (4.01) 73.4 (2.80) 36.3 (-9.42) 77.3 (5.19) 
Survey 28.3 (-3.36) 0.0 (-6.74) 62.7 (10.92) 20.3 (-4.83) 
Other 1.7 (-1.78) 26.6 (9.69) 1.1 (-3.38) 2.3 (-1.07) 
Case definition 
(n = 592) 
Direct 68.6 (6.36) 24.0 (-3.38) 27.6 (-8.64) 72.8 (6.20) 
Serological 24.4 (-5.17) 44.0 (0.32) 60.7 (8.53) 20.2 (-5.23) 
Both 4.5 (-1.93) 20.0 (3.22) 10.3 (1.80) 2.6 (-2.38) 
Clinical / 
pathological 
2.6 (-0.53) 12.0 (3.69) 1.5 (-2.21) 4.4 (0.79) 
Risk-based Yes 57.9 (0.37) 50.0 (-1.14) 63.3 (2.97) 44.2 (-3.21) 
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(n = 635) No  42.1 (-0.37) 50.0 (1.14) 36.7 (-2.97) 55.8 (3.21) 
Multi-hazard 
(n = 571) 
Yes 18.7 (-5.37) 35.1 (-0.22) 59.5 (9.83) 12.8 (-5.95) 
No  81.3 (5.37) 64.9 (0.22) 40.5 (-9.83) 87.2 (5.95) 
a Adjusted residuals greater than ±1.96 were highlighted in bold as they are more extreme than what would be 768 
expected if the null hypothesis of independence was true. 769 
  770 
39 
 
Table 5. Percentage of risk-based sampling components (n = 366) stratified by risk factor (95% CI: 95% 771 
confidence interval). Multiple selections of risk factors per components were allowed. The risk-based 772 
components were a subset of active surveillance components (n = 664) recorded for 10 study countries 773 
for the year 2011. 774 
Risk factor Percentage of 
components (95% CI) 
Main type Comments (remaining components either 
other type or unknown) 
Production type 45.1% (39.9%, 53%) Targeted 142/165: Only breeding animals; 96/142: 
Surveillance in artificial insemination 
centres 
Age 24.3% (2%, 29.0%) Targeted 36/89: Serological components targeting 
only older animals; 37/89: BSE/scrapie 
components targeting older animals only 
Region 13.1% (9.8%, 17.0%) Stratified 27/48: Surveillance intensity depended on 
epidemiological situation in the region 
Herd size 11.2% (8.2%, 14.9%) Targeted 37/41: Only large sized farms were targeted 
Time period 6.0% (3.8%, 9.0%) Varies Restricted to high-risk period (e.g. 
demonstrate freedom at end of high-risk 
period) or different sampling intensity 
between seasons 
Production for human 
consumption 
3.6% (1.9%, 6.0%) Targeted  
Farm factors 3.8% (2.1%, 6.3%) Varies 5/13: Targeting only outdoor farms 
Species 2.5% (1.1%, 4.6%) Varies Since components were generally split by 
species, this risk factor was predominantly 
recorded for avian influenza (distinction 
between wild bird and waterfowl species) 
Event  2.2% (9%, 4.3%) Targeted Testing prior to transport 
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Disease status of the 
herd 
2.2% (9%, 4.3%) Targeted E.g. certified free herds versus non-free 
herds 
Trade 1.1% (3%, 2.8%) Varies Trade volume (e.g. out-degree movements) 
Previous 2.2% (9%, 4.3%) Stratified Previous irregularities or positive findings 
Various 8% (2%, 2.4%) NAa  
Unknown 1.9% (8%, 3.9%) NAa  
a Not applicable. 775 
